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MORTGAGES, FIXTURES, FITTINGS, AND 
SECURITY OVER PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Dr Sean Thomas
*
 
A. Introduction 
A mortgage is merely a disposition of an interest in property as security for a loan.
1
  This 
creates a deceptively simple problem: where to draw the line between providing protection 
for mortgagees and mortgagors of residential property?
2
  In the event of a breach of the 
mortgage agreement (usually due to default in repayment), the remedies of repossession and 
sale will likely be most significant for residential mortgagors.  Although subject to cogent 
criticism,
3
 this right to repossess exists independently of statutory powers,
4
 and is often 
(though not necessarily) the precursor to the right of sale.
5
  The power of sale can be based on 
the mortgage agreement, or implied by statute, and notably it can be exercised regardless of 
the mortgagor’s wishes.6 As such, residential mortgagors are ‘especially vulnerable [in] that 
they have put the homes of themselves and their families at risk by entering into the 
mortgage’,7 which is problematic as the law generally favours mortgagees.8   
                                                 
*
 Senior Lecturer in Law, Durham Law School, Durham University.  An early version of this article was 
presented at the Socio-Legal Studies Association Conference, De Montford University, April 2012, and the 
author wishes to thank the participants for their useful comments.  Particular thanks also go to Professor Adam 
Cygan and Barbara Bogusz for their help.  Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers for their comments.  The 
author is a member of the Secured Transactions Law Reform Project 
(http://securedtransactionslawreformproject.org/) and agrees with its aims and objectives, but this article 
represents the author’s personal view and is not necessarily representative of the Project’s position on the 
matters discussed herein.   
1
 Santley v Wilde [1899] 2 Ch 474, 474 (Lindley LJ); Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA) ss 87, 88, 91. 
2
 See, for example, P Omar, ‘Recovery of secured property by mortgagees: the balance of interests’ (2005) 16 
ICCLR 445. 
3
 See, for example, M Dixon, ‘Editor’s Notebook’ [2008] Conv 474. 
4
 Four Maids Ltd v Dudley Marshall Ltd [1957] Ch 317, 320 (Harman J); Ropaigealach v Barclays Bank plc 
[2000] 1 QB 263; Horsham Properties Group Ltd v Clark [2008] EWHC 2327; [2009] 1 WLR 1255 (Ch). 
5
 LPA s 91(2). 
6
 LPA ss 101-103; Palk v Mortgage Services Funding plc [1993] Ch 330; Polonski v Lloyds Bank Mortgages 
Ltd (1998) 31 HLR 721.  See also Trusts of Land and Trustees Act 1996 s 14(1).  Cf FSA, Mortgages and Home 
Finance: Conduct of Business Sourcebook (available at < http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/hb-
releases/rel112/rel112_MCOB.pdf>), suggesting a minimum of two months arrears before bringing 
proceedings. 
7
 Law Commission, Transfer of Land – Land Mortgages (Law Com No 204, 1991) [4.5]. 
8
 C Davis, ‘Giving with one hand and taking away with the other: how far can a mortgagor insist on selling his 
property?’ (1998) 1 JHL 56; M Dixon, ‘Combating the mortgagee’s right to possession: new hope for the 
mortgagor in chains?’ (1998) 18 Legal Studies 279; M Davey, ‘Insolvency and the family home’ [2000] 
Insolvency Lawyer 2; L Fox, Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies (Hart Publishing 2007) ch 1; 
S Bright, ‘Dispossession for Arrears: The Weight of Home in English Law’, ch 2 in L Fox O’Mahony and J A 
Sweeney (eds), The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and Dispossession (Ashgate 2011).  Cf F O Adeoye, 
‘The Anglo-American law of mortgagees: a quagmire for creditors’ [1993] JBL 544, arguing the law has shifted 
too far in restricting mortgagees. 
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As goods may be attached to land, along a spectrum of affixation,
9
 there is a complex 
sub-problem: If a mortgagee can sell mortgaged property, to what extent does that power 
extend to goods associated with the property?  Although mortgages of realty need to be in 
writing and registered,
10
 the details of the mortgage agreement will not be registered even 
though such details may seemingly give the mortgagee such a power to control, acquire or 
sell goods associated with the realty.  Ascertaining such details requires direct enquiry of the 
lender or (possibly) the borrower.
11
  However, ‘mortgages have always pretended to a greater 
or less degree to be something they are not’.12 
Consider the HSBC Bank plc Mortgage Deed Conditions (2006 Edition).
13
  In the 
definition section, condition 1(e) defines ‘Property’ as ‘the whole or any part of the Property 
described in the Mortgage (including all buildings, fixtures and fittings on the Property now, 
or at any time after the date of the Mortgage).’  Condition 1(f) defines ‘Assets’ as ‘anything 
and everything charged, assigned or transferred by the Mortgage.’  In the section entitled 
‘Looking after the Property’, condition 5(c) states that the mortgagor must not, without the 
Bank’s written consent ‘(i) … remove or detach any fixture or fitting; or (ii) remove or detach 
any plant or machinery which belongs to, or is used by, you (except for replacement or 
repair).’  Condition 5(d) stated that ‘If you, or anyone else, removes or detaches any fixture, 
fitting, plant or machinery or, if any is destroyed or damaged, you must immediately replace 
or repair it with one of the same or better quality.’  In the section entitled ‘Safeguarding the 
Bank’s Security’, condition 9(d) states the mortgagor ‘must not, without the Bank’s written 
consent, at any time create or allow any other mortgage, charge or burden in relation to the 
Assets.’  In the event of the appointment of a receiver, the mortgage deed states in condition 
13(a) that the receiver has the power ‘to sell, exchange, lease or in any other way dispose of 
the Assets in the manner and generally on terms the receiver thinks fit in your name and on 
your behalf’ and, under 13(b), the power ‘to do anything an absolute owner could do with the 
Assets’. 
                                                 
9
 See, for example, Elitestone Ltd v Morris [1997] 1 WLR 687; cf P Luther, ‘The foundations of Elitestone’ 
(2008) 28 Legal Studies 574. 
10
 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s 2; Land Registration Act 2002 ss 27-30. 
11
 There is a lack of clarity as to obligation on mortgagees or mortgagors vis-à-vis registration of the mortgage.  
The Land Registration Rules 2003 r 9 states, inter alia, that ‘The charges register of a registered estate must 
contain, where appropriate (a) details of … charges, and any other interests which adversely affect the registered 
estate subsisting at the time of first registration of the estate or created thereafter, (b) any dealings with the 
interests referred to in paragraph (a), or affecting their priority, which are capable of being noted on the register, 
(c) sufficient details to enable any registered charge to be identified’. 
12
 A W B Simpson, A History of The Land Law (2nd edn, OUP 1986), at p. 242.  F W Maitland, Equity (2nd rev 
edn, CUP 1936) 182: the mortgage deed is ‘one long suppression veri and suggestion falsi’. 
13
 This was supplied to the author in pursuance of an application for mortgaged financing for the purchase of a 
residential property.  Copy on file with the author. 
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There is also a section entitled ‘Items left at the Property’, in which condition 22 
states:  
 
(a) At any time after the Mortgage has become enforceable, the Bank or any receiver 
may (but having no duty or liability to you to do so) as your agent and at your 
expense, remove, store, preserve, sell or otherwise deal with any furniture, goods, 
vehicles, plant or machinery or other chattels or produce, crops or animals which you 
fail or refuse to remove from the Property.  (b) Neither the Bank nor any receiver will 
be liable for any resulting loss or damage.  (c) So far as may be lawful, the Bank may 
set-off any sums realised on any sale against the [mortgage] Debt.   
 
In essence, this deed provides that, in the event of default and repossession, HSBC are 
entitled to such effective control of all goods on or in the land that they might as well be 
considered as claiming ownership of the goods.
14
  The underlying purpose of the mortgage 
agreement’s extension into personal property may just be to enable effective control of the 
real property in the event of default.
15
  However, the legal effect of this approach give rise to 
a problematic question: who truly owns goods in residential properties, where the goods are 
acquired after a purchase-price mortgage is granted?  
At first sight, the answer is obvious.  Subject to an expressed contrary intention,
16
 a 
conveyance ‘shall be deemed to include and shall by virtue of this Act operate to convey, 
with the land, all … fixtures…’.17  Leading texts follow this by noting that fixtures are goods 
which, according to the degree and purpose of their annexation to the land, lose their identity 
as goods and become part of the land.
18
  Immediately after making this point, one such text 
noted that, ‘[r]ights of foreclosure, possession and statutory rights of sale extend to the 
interest in any fixtures or personal chattels affected by the mortgage’.19  The distinction 
between fixtures and goods ‘affected by the mortgage’ is unclear.  For example, in Whitely v 
                                                 
14
 Other lenders are more explicit.  The Halifax Mortgage Conditions 2011, at page 38 states: ‘How we can deal 
with things left in your property[:] If we take possession of your property, we may remove, store, sell or dispose 
of anything you leave at your property (including animals).  We will do this as your “agent”.  You will have to 
pay our costs of doing this.’  
15
 See n 109 and accompanying text.   
16
 LPA s 62(4).  A conveyance includes a mortgage: LPA s 205(1)(ii). 
17
 LPA s 62(1).  This may be an example of how principles of accession reduced transaction costs in the transfer 
of property: T W Merrill, ‘Accession and Original Ownership’ (2009) 1 Journal of Legal Analysis 459, 485-486. 
18
 See, for example, E F Cousins and I Clarke, Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) [15-
01]; C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2008) [23-002] – [23-003]. 
19
 Cousins and Clarke, Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 18) [15-01], citing the LPA ss 88(4), s89(4),  Cross 
v Barnes (1877) 36 LT 693, and Re Rogerstone Brick and Stone Co Ltd [1919] 1 Ch 110. 
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Challis, concerning a claim that certain words in a conveyance brought goodwill (i.e. 
personal property) within the scope of mortgage of realty, Lindley LJ said such words 
‘cannot have the effect of bringing in property which the mortgagor had not agreed to 
mortgage … [for otherwise is to allow a claim] … to obtain an enlargement of that security, 
and to get a benefit to which [the mortgagee] is not entitled’.20  Therefore, one security 
interest (a mortgage over land) cannot beget another security interest (over goods held by the 
residential mortgagor).   
The Law Commission has consistently failed to examine this issue,
21
 even though it 
has recognised the ‘contact and overlap’ between systems for mortgages over land and 
systems covering other property meant that ‘conflicting or inconvenient results’ need to be 
avoided.
22
  There was also no consideration of this point in the recent Ministry of Justice 
Consultation Paper Mortgages: Powers of Sale and Residential Property.
23
  Likewise, this 
issue is not considered in the very recent Law Commission Consultation Paper on reforming 
the law on bills of sale.
24
  To avoid perpetuating misunderstanding,
25
 the extent to which a 
mortgage over realty can capture or control personal property needs deeper exploration.
26
  It 
is on one hand an issue of principle,
27
 but it may also be an issue of money, as certain goods 
that occupy the ‘twilight zone’28 between fixtures and fittings may be highly valuable (such 
as a range-style cooker-heater like an AGA, or a fish tank and assorted accoutrements).  
Further complexities may arise regarding the status of new technologies and their place 
                                                 
20
 [1892] 1 Ch 64, 69. 
21
 Law Commission, Transfer of Land – Land Mortgages (Law Com No 204, 1991); Law Commission, 
Company Security Interests (Law Com No 296, 2005) xiv.   
22
 In Law Commission, Land Mortgages (Law Com Working Paper 99, 1986) [1.4].  The non-coverage of 
personal property security interests by the Law Commission in 1986 was due to the concurrent work by 
Professor Diamond: A Diamond, A Review of Security Interests in Property (HMSO, 1989). 
23
 Consultation Paper CP55/09, 29 December 2009. 
24
 Law Commission, Bills of Sale: A Consultation Paper (Law Com CP 225, 2015); see also n 217 and 
following text. 
25
 Cf G Watt, ‘The Lie of the Land: Mortgage Law as Legal Fiction’, in E. Cooke (ed), Modern Studies in 
Property Law: Volume 4 (Hart Publishing, 2007) ch 4. 
26
 As to the importance of control over property, see generally P DiCola, ‘Valuing Control’ (2015) 113 Mich L 
Rev 663. 
27
 D L Carey Miller, ‘Fixtures and auxiliary items: are recent decisions blurring real and personal rights?’ (1984) 
101 SALJ 205, 207.  For a recent comparative analysis, see L P W van Vliet, ‘Accession of Movables to Land: 
I’ (2002) 6 Edin L Rev 67; ‘Accession of Movables to Land: II’ (2002) 6 Edin L Rev 199.  However, for both 
Carey Miller and van Vliet, the focus of their work was clearly on commercial issues, with little concentrated 
focus on the issues concerning residential purchase-money mortgages.  Moreover, a common-law perspective 
may result in different analysis. 
28
 Cf M R Friedman, ‘The Scope of Mortgage Liens on Fixtures and Personal Property in New York’ (1938)  7 
Fordham L Rev 331, 331: ‘Occupying a twilight zone between real and personal property the area of fixtures is 
one which defies precise metes and bounds.’ 
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within the home.
29
  It should also be noted that the HSBC deed also covered animals, and 
there have recently been complicated disputes concerning the rights of mortgagees to deal 
with animals held both commercially,
30
 and domestically.
31
 
This article will demonstrate how the doctrine on fixtures and fittings was developed 
to avoid difficulties with the bills of sale regime in the context of non-residential commercial 
mortgage transactions.  As a result mortgagees of realty were able to exert ownership-like 
control over personal property.  The shift in focus in the bills of sale regime from creditor to 
debtor protection had no impact on this use of the fixtures doctrine, thus rendering the 
overwhelmingly commercial nature of the law on fixtures and fittings inappropriate for 
residential consumer purchase-money mortgages.
32
  As such, merely resting our 
understanding of the relationship between goods and land on a doctrine that goods affixed to 
land lose their status as goods and become part of the land, is insufficient to explain and 
continually justify the potential power mortgagees appear to have acquired.  This article will 
argue for a narrower construction of mortgagees’ powers of control over goods.  
B. Mortgages of Land and Fixtures 
Although ‘determining when an object which was formerly a chattel has become part of land, 
is recognized to be complex and confusing,’ there are basic principles.33  In the leading case 
Holland v Hodgson Blackburn J said that the general principle quicquid planatur solo, solo 
cedit (whatever is attached to land becomes part of the land itself) was ‘the general maxim of 
the law’,34 and it remains ‘the foundation of the modern law of fixtures’.35  This principle 
obviously affects the mortgage relationship,
36
 as well as third party rights: if fixtures pass to 
                                                 
29
 This is further complicated by the potential of an internet of things, and the problems in the current law on 
sale of goods: see, for example, S Thomas, ‘Goods with embedded software: obligations under Section 12 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979’ (2012) 26 International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 165. 
30
 National Westminster Bank v Hunter [2011] EWHC 3170 (Ch), discussed at n 105. 
31
 Campbell v Redstone Mortgages Ltd [2014] EWHC 3081 (Ch) (power to remove animals held at an informal 
sanctuary). 
32
 The term “consumer” here means ‘persons who borrow for private purposes not related at all to their business, 
trade or profession’, following the approach in Law Commission, Registration of Security Interests: Company 
Charges and Property Other Than Land (Law Com CP 164, 2002) [8.4].  See also Ministry of Justice, 
Mortgages: Powers of Sale and Residential Property (Consultation Paper CP55/09, 29 December 2009) [22].  
This article will not consider the special position of agricultural land and fixtures thereto, for which see, for 
example, Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 s 10; Agricultural Tenancies Act 1995 s 8. 
33
 P Luther, ‘Fixtures and chattels: a question of more or less’ (2004) 24 OJLS 597, 597.  On the difficulty of 
reconciling the case-law on fixtures, see also Reynolds v Ashby [1904] AC 466, 473-474 (Lord Lindley). 
34
 Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328.  For the history of the use of this maxim in English law, see Luther, 
‘Fixtures and chattels’ (n 33) 598-601. 
35
 M Haley, ‘Case Comment: The law of fixtures: an unprincipled metamorphosis?’ [1998] Conv 137, 137. 
36
 Cousins and Clarke, Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 18) [15-01]: ‘The rule applies to all fixtures which 
are the subject matter of legal or an equitable mortgages [citing Re Lusty (1889) 60 LT 160] of freehold or 
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the mortgagee, a trustee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor is not entitled to those “goods”.37  
However, as Cousins and Clarke recognise, this principle merely ‘provides a good starting 
point for the consideration of the relationship between fixtures and mortgages of the land to 
which they are affixed’.38  It is suggested this claim of a general principle masks a historical 
pattern of doctrinal development focused on non-residential commercial mortgages and 
ignores the impact of the bills of sale regime.  The law is incoherent and uncertain, ‘unduly 
cumbersome’, and relies on ‘anachronistic rules and case-law’.39  This makes attempts to 
simply apply the doctrine to residential mortgagors highly problematic.    
1  THE LEADING CASES ON FIXTURES 
From the 16th century English law distinguished between owners in fee simple and tenants 
with regard to fixtures: tenants were able to remove items (during the term) which had been 
affixed to the land.
40
  The status of ‘trade fixtures ... remained in doubt until the 17th 
century’, though by the 18th century tenants could remove them for the benefit of trade and 
commerce:
41
 around the same time the tenant’s right to remove ornamental and domestic 
fixtures developed.
42
  The extension of this exception (for trade fixtures) to heirs did not have 
solid foundations,
43
 and for well into the 19th century the key determining factor for fixtures 
held by someone other than a tenant was the degree of annexation rather than any particular 
right.
44
  Yet whilst the distinction between tenants and mortgagors as to their rights over 
                                                                                                                                                        
leasehold land [citing Meux v Jacobs (1875) LR 7 App Cas 481; Southport and West Lancashire Banking Co v 
Thompson (1887) 37 Ch D 64, approved in National Provincial and Union Bank of England v Charnley [1924] 
1 KB 431]’. 
37
 Clark v Crownshaw (1832) 3 B & Ad 804; 110 ER 295 (not entitled to the fixtures, but entitled to the 
otherwise movable goods); Ashton v Blackshaw (1869-70) LR 9 Eq 510 (assignment of furniture within the 
scope of the Bills of Sale Acts, and thus as an unregistered bill of sale the assignment was void, otherwise the 
goods would be secured for the plaintiff’s use). 
38
 Cf Cousins and Clarke, Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 18) [15-01]. 
39
 Haley, ‘Case Comment’ (n 35) 144. 
40
 Luther, ‘Fixtures and chattels’ (n 33) 601-602.  See also Sir John Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of 
England: volume VI 1483-1558 (OUP 2003) 735-738; Simpson, A History of The Land Law (n 12) 242-243.  
The nature of actions as to personal or real property must have played a role: Simpson, A History of The Land 
Law, chs X and XI, and Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, ch 39.  Economy unfortunately 
prevents a full examination of this history. 
41
 Luther, ‘Fixtures and chattels’ (n 33) 602. 
42
 Ibid, 606. 
43
 Ibid, 603-604. 
44
 Ibid, 605. 
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fixtures was clearly evident in Holland v Hodgson in 1872,
45
 by 1887 it had more or less 
dissipated.
46
   
In Holland v Hodgson the object (or purpose) of annexation test, as central to 
determining whether goods became affixed to land, was crystallised.
47
  Luther correctly 
argues this test was actually a novel combination of different tests,
48
 but its effect was to 
distinguish between the extent to which assets could be removed (which depended on the 
object of annexation) and whether the assets attached to the land in the first place (which 
turned on the degree of annexation), which in turn focused judicial attention on the 
commercial importance of security for mortgagees of industrial property.
49
  Such creditors 
were more interested in the extent to which they could protect and enhance their interest by 
acquiring, if necessary, the annexed asset.  However, a close reading of Holland reveals it 
actually had little to do with settling a coherent test for fixtures and fittings.
50
  Moreover, 
although there were clear references by Blackburn J as to the importance of party intention,
51
 
intention became secondary to the test of the manner by which goods were attached.
52
  At the 
turn of the nineteenth century the irrelevance of intention became apparent in the Court of 
Appeal decision Hobson v Gorringe,
53
 and the House of Lords case Reynolds v Ashby.
54
  At 
the end of the twentieth century, the House of Lords in Melluish v BMI (No 3) Ltd,
55
 and 
Elitestone Ltd v Morris,
56
 reiterated that approach.  These four leading cases indicate that the 
key test to determine the extent of a mortgagee’s rights is simply whether the goods have 
become fixtures. Party intention vis-à-vis ownership of the goods is essentially irrelevant 
even where the ownership of the goods resides with a third party.  However, the authority of 
these decisions in non-commercial situations is dubious at best.   
                                                 
45
 Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328, 333.  See also, for example, Ex parte Dalglish (1872-73) LR 8 Ch 
App 1072. 
46
 Southport and West Lancashire Banking Co v Thompson (1887) LR 37 ChD 64.  See also Reynolds v Ashby 
[1904] AC 466, 473 (Lord Lindley). 
47
 (1872) LR 7 CP 328, 334-335 (Blackburn J). 
48
 Luther, ‘Fixtures and chattels’ (n 33) 601-605.  See also Hellawell v Eastwood (1851) 6 Ex 295, 312-313; 155 
ER 554, 561 (Parke B). 
49
 Luther, ‘Fixtures and chattels’ (n 33) 612-614. 
50
 See text following n 143. 
51
 (1872) LR 7 CP 328, 335: ‘if the intention is apparent to make the articles part of the land, they do become 
part of the land: see D’Eyncourt v Gregory [(1866) LR 3 Eq 382].’ 
52
 Luther, ‘Fixtures and chattels’ (n 33) 615-618. 
53
 [1897] 1 Ch 182. 
54
 [1904] AC 466. 
55
 [1996] AC 454. 
56
 [1997] 1 WLR 687. 
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In Gough v Wood & Co,
57
 the defendants agreed to supply a tenant with a boiler for 
the purposes of the tenant’s business, with the property in the boiler remaining with the 
defendants until all instalments were paid and with a right of removal in the event of default.  
The tenant mortgaged his interest in the land to the plaintiff, who did not know of the prior 
transaction.  Following this, the boiler was affixed to the land.  Upon default the defendants 
removed the boiler.  It was held the mortgagee must have acquiesced in the mortgagor fixing 
and removing fixtures for the purpose of trade.  The importance of this implied acquiescence 
to mortgagors acting in the course of business is clear in ‘the principal case’:58 Hobson v 
Gorringe.
59
 
In Hobson the mortgagor acquired a gas engine under a hire-purchase scheme, prior to 
the mortgage.  The engine was attached to freehold land by bolts and screws (to prevent it 
moving during use) and was used by the mortgagor for the purposes of his trade.  The 
mortgagee had no knowledge of the hire-purchase.  Upon default, the mortgagee took 
possession whilst the engine was still on the land.  A L Smith LJ said:  
  
[If the machine] always remained a chattel, [it would have] consequently never passed 
to Gorringe as mortgagee of the land.  It obviously did not pass to him as a chattel 
under the mortgage to him of “fixed machinery,” for, if a chattel, it ever remained 
Hobson’s [the seller], and never was the property of King [the mortgagor/hirer]; and 
unless Mr. Gorringe takes the engine as part of the land mortgaged to him he does not 
take it at all.
60
   
 
As the engine was attached to the land, the mortgagee had priority.  The intention, evidenced 
in the hire-purchase agreement, that the engine would remain goods could not override the 
affixation of the goods.  This was partly because Hobson’s right to remove the engine on 
default was not of the nature of legal or equitable rights in land that could take priority over a 
third party.
61
  The other aspect of the decision was  
 
That a person can agree to affix a chattel to the soil of another so that it becomes part 
of that other’s freehold upon the terms that the one shall be at liberty in certain events 
                                                 
57
 [1894] 1 QB 713. 
58
 Reynolds v Ashby [1904] AC 466, 471 (Lord James). 
59
 [1897] Ch 182. 
60
 Ibid, 189. 
61
 Ibid, 192 (A L Smith LJ). 
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to retake possession we do not doubt, but how a de facto fixture becomes not a fixture 
or is not a fixture as regards a purchaser of land for value without notice by reason of 
some bargain between the affixers we do not understand, nor has any authority to 
support this contention been adduced.
62
 
 
The fact that Hobson had failed to remove the engine prior to the mortgagee’s claim was 
enough to dispose of the case.  The Court did not explain what distinguished the insufficiency 
of the agreement between the vendor and vendee (on the grounds its content was unknown to 
the mortgagee) and the sufficiency of the agreement between mortgagor and mortgagee (even 
though its contents were equally unknown as to the vendor). 
The Court of Appeal would face similar issues three years later in Monti v Barnes.
63
  
Unusually this case concerned a residential mortgage.  The owner of a residential house 
mortgaged the property in 1890, the mortgage being transferred to the defendant in 1893.  
Later in 1893 the owner sold the equity of redemption in the mortgage, and also the furniture, 
fittings, and effects therein, to the plaintiff.  In 1898 the defendant foreclosed the mortgage 
and became owner in fee of the house.  The original mortgagor had removed certain grates 
(used to hold solid fuel) and replaced them with “dog grates”, a particularly heavy type.  The 
plaintiff-mortgagor had removed the dog grates; the defendant-mortgagee claimed this was a 
wrongful detention.  If these dog grates were fixtures, they would pass to the mortgagee.   
A L Smith MR focused on the weight of the grates, and also ‘the intention with which 
the mortgagor placed the dog grates in the house, [for] it is obvious that he could not have 
intended that the house should be without grates; and I have no doubt that the dog grates were 
put in to fill the place of the old fixed grates, which he took out, and to pass with the 
inheritance.’64  Collins LJ recognised that this dispute ‘differs widely from that of landlord 
and tenant.’65  As such a ‘mortgagor [who brought] an article on to the mortgaged premises, 
although it may be after the mortgage, would generally not regard the premises as belonging 
to any one but himself, and would therefore be the more likely to intend the article to be for 
the improvement of the property from which he does not contemplate being ousted.’66  
Stirling LJ thought that  
 
                                                 
62
 Ibid, 195 (A L Smith LJ). 
63
 [1901] 1 QB 205. 
64
 Ibid, 207. 
65
 Ibid, 208. 
66
 Ibid. 
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it is most material to observe that [the dog grates] were placed there by the mortgagor 
after the mortgage, and in the place of the old fixed grates which existed at the time of 
the mortgage.  It seems to me that, if the mortgagor had removed the old grates 
without substituting any grates for them, he would have been guilty of waste, such as 
would call for the interference of the Court at the instance of the mortgagee.
67
 
 
Although Monti appears very similar to the residential mortgage situation at the heart of this 
article, it cannot support the broader claim that all goods which attach to the realty must pass 
to the mortgagee as it was accepted that dog grates were an improvement of the realty.  It is 
this which explains the references to intention in Monti.  However, it was the mortgagor’s 
intentions alone which the Court took into account, not the intention of all relevant parties.  
Furthermore, it was the mortgagor’s intention in his capacity as mortgagor of realty, and not 
as owner of personality, that was taken as relevant.  Moreover, the reference to waste by 
Stirling LJ and the distinction drawn with a tenancy by Collins LJ suggests Monti was the last 
convulsion of the freehold/leasehold distinction that had previously dominated these sort of 
disputes.  At this point it is necessary to return to the development of fixtures law per se and 
the important decision in Reynolds v Ashby.
68
  
In Reynolds the House of Lords held that where a machine, acquired by hire-purchase, 
had been attached to land by means of nuts and bolts, the mortgagee took priority over the 
seller of the machine when the hirer defaulted, as the machine had become part of the land.  
The fact that hire-purchase meant the appellant retained title to the goods could not override 
the fact that ‘machines were sold by the appellant for the purpose of being used in the manner 
in which they were used.  In order so to use them it was necessary that they should be fixed, 
and so become part of the building.’69  As Lord Lindley put it: ‘[i]t is true that the machines 
could be removed if necessary, but the concrete beds and bolts prepared for them negative 
any idea of treating the machines when fixed as movable chattels.’70 
 For Lord Lindley, the best approach for dealing with fixtures was to pay attention ‘not 
only to the nature of the thing and to the mode of attachment, but to the circumstances under 
which it was attached, the purpose to be served, and last but not least to the position of the 
rival claimants to the things in dispute.’71  This final element is important: assessing the 
                                                 
67
 Ibid, 209. 
68
 [1904] AC 466.   
69
 Ibid, 472 (Lord James). 
70
 Ibid.  Lord Lindley (at 474) treated the decision in Lyon & Co as correctly decided, but sui generis. 
71
 Ibid, 474. 
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relative priority of the parties to the dispute, which could be undertaken in an objective 
fashion, is substantially different to assessing subjective intentions, and opens a gap for 
policy-based analysis based on the importance of smoothing the free flow of credit.  
However, Lord Lindley was content to hold that the vendor of the goods knew of the 
mortgage and knew of the risks involved, and so could be held to run the risk that the 
machine sold would become a fixture.  Either the vendor effectively authorised the 
conversion of the goods into fixtures, or he had lost the right to repossess the goods by failing 
to exercise the right prior to the mortgagee taking possession.
72
 
 The shift in the focus of judicial analysis, from attachment per se to the purpose and 
use of the goods,
73
 enables a more contextual approach, but it still does not mean that 
intention is relevant, as the purpose and use of goods can be ascertained objectively.
74
  
Furthermore, the importance of the disponor’s failure to re-acquire the goods prior to the 
mortgagee taking possession of the realty (regardless of any contractual intention otherwise) 
remained significant.  This much can be seen from the important duo of cases in the House of 
Lords in the 1990s.  In Melluish v BMI (No 3) Ltd,
75
 leasing companies claimed a tax 
reduction based on their retention of ownership of boilers that had been installed, under lease 
arrangements with local authorities, in local authority housing.  The agreement between the 
parties as to the ownership of the boilers could not override the principle effect of annexation, 
i.e. the necessary extinction of their status as goods,
76
 even if the lease agreements provided 
the lease companies with a right to retake possession in the event of default.  Lord Browne-
Wilkinson said  
 
The terms expressly or implicitly agreed between the fixer of the chattel and the 
owner of the land cannot affect the determination of the question whether, in law, the 
chattel has become a fixture and therefore in law belongs to the owner of the soil ... 
The terms of such agreement will regulate the contractual rights to sever the chattel 
from the land as between the parties to that contract and, where an equitable right is 
conferred by the contract, as against certain third parties.  But such agreement cannot 
                                                 
72
 Ibid, 475. 
73
 The question of attachment per se could still be relevant though: see, for example, Hulme v Brigham [1943] 1 
KB 152. 
74
 Thus the different results in Lyon & Co v London City and Midland Bank [1903] 2 KB 135 (treated as sui 
generis in Reynolds v Ashby [1904] AC 466, 474 (Lord Lindley)) and Vauderville Electric Cinema v Muriset 
[1923] 2 Ch 74 (where Sargant J (at 87) distinguished Lyon & Co). 
75
 [1996] 1 AC 454. 
76
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prevent the chattel, once fixed, becoming in law part of the land and as such owned by 
the owner of the land so long as it remains fixed.
77
 
 
The following year saw Elitestone Ltd v Morris,
78
 concerning a wooden chalet, which rested 
on concrete pillars attached to the ground such that it could only be removed from the land by 
demolition.  The claimant owned the freehold; the defendant occupied the chalet under a 
purported licence.  The claimant brought proceedings to obtain possession of the land.  The 
defendant claimed he was a protected tenant under the Rent Act 1977 s 1.  The House of 
Lords held that the chalet’s construction was such that an objective assessment would 
indicate that it could not have remained a chattel, but must have been intended (regardless of 
the common assumption of both parties that the chalet was Morris’s personal property) to 
form part of the realty.  This meant that Morris succeeded, as the chalet was held to be part of 
the land and thus the Rent Act 1977 applied.  
This conclusion was reached by virtue of application of the two part test expressed by 
Blackburn J, i.e. it depended on the degree and object of annexation to the land.
79
  Lord 
Lloyd followed Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s speech in Melluish and said ‘[i]f an express 
agreement cannot prevent a chattel from becoming part of the land, so long as it is fixed to 
the land, it is obvious that a common assumption cannot have that effect.’80  Similarly, Lord 
Clyde held that ‘[i]t is the purpose which the object is serving which has to be regarded, not 
the purpose of the person who put it there.  The question is whether the object is designed for 
the use or enjoyment of the land or for the more complete or convenient use or enjoyment of 
the thing itself.’81 
Thus the purpose goods serve determines whether they become part of the realty, and 
any prior contract between the disponor of goods and a disponee will be insufficient to negate 
the effect of that purpose.  All we really know from Melluish and Elitestone is that the 
disponor of goods has to remove the goods prior to the land being repossessed to avoid losing 
                                                 
77
 Ibid.  See also, for example, Cousins and Clarke, Cousins on the Law of Mortgages (n 18) [15-02]: ‘If chattels 
which are bailed under a hire or hire-purchase agreement, or are agreed to be sold under a conditional sale 
agreement, become fixtures (other than trade fixtures) they become subject to the mortgage even if affixed after 
it was created.’  The reference supporting this statement (footnote 12) merely states: ‘As to whether a chattel has 
become a fixture, see Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328; Crossley Bros v Lee [1908] 1 KB 86 [a gas 
engine let out on hire, affixed to the floor of business premises by bolts and screws, was held to be a fixture]’.   
78
 [1997] 1 WLR 687.   
79
 There is a different aspect to Elitestone, concerning the application of a three-fold approach to goods, fixtures, 
and things that are part and parcel of the land itself, for which see P Luther, ‘The foundations of Elitestone’ 
(2008) 28 Legal Studies 574.  For recent application of Elitestone in a dispute concerning a Henry Moore 
sculpture, see Tower Hamlets LBC v Bromley LBC [2015] EWHC 1954 (Ch) 
80
 [1997] 1 WLR 687, 690. 
81
 Ibid, 698. 
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any pre-existing interest in the asset, which repeats the analysis in Hobson and Reynolds.
82
    
However, neither decision engaged with Lord Lindley’s analysis in Reynolds v Ashby, 
specifically the third limb: ‘the position of the rival claimants to the things in dispute.’83  In 
Melluish, Lord Browne-Wilkinson appeared to rely entirely on Hobson v Gorringe and only 
referred to Reynolds to note that it approved Hobson,
84
 which was replicated in Elitestone.
85
  
The position of the residential mortgagor cannot be accurately ascertained  Neither Melluish 
nor Elitestone involved a residential consumer purchase-money mortgage (or indeed even a 
mortgage at all), and Gough and Hobson concerned situations where goods were acquired 
and attached (whether sufficient to qualify as a fixture or not) prior to the mortgage.  
Reynolds did involve a post-mortgage acquisition of goods, but it too was in a commercial 
context.  The only non-commercial case, Monti, is best treated as an anachronistic outlier.  
2  APPLICATION IN RECENT CASE-LAW 
The lack of direction from the leading cases as to the extent of a mortgagee’s powers of 
control over goods in consumer cases may explain the nature of the reasoning in two cases 
which were much more relevant for the problem at hand, which were decided in between the 
House of Lords decisions in Melluish and Elitestone.
86
 
In Deutsche Genossenchafts Hypothekenbank v Amstad,
87
 the claimant bank lent 
money to Amstad on terms described as ‘a legal mortgage on the pledged property’.88  The 
loan concerned a mortgage over land, and not a charge over personal property.
89
  Following 
default, the claimant appeared to appoint a receiver.  Harman J stated that whilst this is 
perfectly acceptable under the Law of Property Act 1925 with regard to mortgaged real 
property,  
 
there is no doubt that chattels in the freehold property do not pass to the mortgagee 
under his legal charge.  He has no rights over chattels, and the Receiver is not entitled 
to take into his possession any chattels there may be.  In a normal private mortgage of 
                                                 
82
 Arguably it also replicated an implicit consequence of the decision in Monti: had the mortgagee there 
removed the dog grates before the mortgagor the case would not have arisen. 
83
 [1904] AC 466, 474. 
84
 [1996] 1 AC 454, 473-475. 
85
 [1997] 1 WLR 687, 693 (Lord Lloyd), 698 (Lord Clyde). 
86
 The order of hearings was Melluish, Botham, Deutsche Genossenchafts Hypothekenbank, then Elitestone. 
87
 (Ch D, 22 January 1997).  This case is cited as authority for the statement that ‘a mortgage of realty normally 
obtains no security over chattels (e.g. furniture) in or on the mortgaged property’ in K Gray and S F Gray, 
Elements of Land Law (5th edn, OUP 2009) [1.2.47], footnote 2. 
88
 (Ch D, 22 January 1997) 1. 
89
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a house to a lender, whether a bank or a building society or a private individual – it 
matters not – for which a normal legal charge such as this is given, there has never 
been any suggestion that the curtains, carpets, beds, sofas, chairs, china, cutlery and 
other chattels in any normal home would pass under the legal mortgage or would be 
available to the Law of Property Act Receivers appointed in respect of such a 
mortgage.
90
 
 
Thus the receiver had no right to take possession of the goods.
91
  Harman J refused to declare 
such goods were part of the charge, because they were not fixtures,
92
 and the agreement 
between the bank and Amstad did not meet the ‘normal requirements’ of a floating charge or 
provide for a fixed charge.
93
   
Around the same time, the Court of Appeal was considering similar issues in Botham 
v TSB Bank.
94
  Botham owned a flat subject to a mortgage in favour of the TSB Bank.  Upon 
default the bank repossessed and eventually sold the flat, but there remained a shortfall of 
some £170,000.  Botham and the bank disputed the status of goods in the flat.  It was agreed 
the 109 separate goods could be classified in the following manner: ‘fitted carpets; light 
fittings; gas fires; curtains and blinds; fittings on sanitary ware; bathroom accessories; mirrors 
and marble panels; kitchen units, work surfaces and sink; and major kitchen appliances (so 
called “white goods”).’95  At first instance these goods were found to be fixtures and part of 
the land (apart from a wall-mounted electric razor), on the basis of the degree and purpose of 
annexation (with the modern emphasis being on the purpose of annexation).  Nevertheless, a 
close examination of what the judges actually said raises various intriguing questions. 
Sir Richard Scott V-C ‘recognised the danger in applying too literally tests formed in 
old cases dealing with machinery in factories to cases regarding articles in residences.  He 
was also wary of applying tests formulated for the purpose of decisions relating to ornamental 
items to cases relating to articles of utility.’96  He also noted that the intrinsic value of the 
goods, and their aesthetic value, would be of at most minimal significance.  Roch LJ took the 
approach that goods necessary for the function of a room, such as lavatory in a bathroom or a 
                                                 
90
 Ibid, 3. 
91
 The point of this action seemed to be that the receiver was attempting to claim an interest in goods which 
Amstad had actually sold to and leased back from a Mr Stone. 
92
 (Ch D, 22 January 1997) 4. 
93
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94
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sink in a kitchen, would constitute fixtures.
97
  However, those goods which were connected to 
the house merely by their connection to a utility supply (such as a light fitting, or a washing 
machine) could not evidence an intention to effect an improvement to the property, as well as 
being only partially attached to the property, and thus they remained goods.
98
  In the 
transcript of the decision, Roch LJ is recorded saying that ‘items installed by a builder, e.g. 
the wall tiles will probably be fixtures, whereas items installed by e.g. a carpet contractor or 
curtain supplier or by the occupier of the building himself or herself may well not be.’99  This 
aspect is likely to turn on the facts of the particular case: for Haley ‘this distinction seems 
both unhelpful and untenable.’100  On the former point, Roch LJ merely said that ‘[i]t must be 
remembered that in many cases the item being considered may be one that has been bought 
by the mortgagor on hire purchase, where the ownership of the item remains in the supplier 
until the instalments have been paid … [and finding such goods to be fixtures] should only be 
made where the intent to effect a permanent improvement in the building is 
incontrovertible.’101  For Haley, whilst the Court took a ‘common sense stance which was 
aimed, in the good common law tradition, to promote practical solutions to practical 
problems’,102 Roch LJ’s focus on the ownership status of the goods ‘represents some 
departure from the traditional approach which largely ignored third party rights over the 
items’.103  Indeed, like the Vice-Chancellor’s approach, this seems unsupportable in light of 
the decisions in Melluish and Elitestone.  Arguably a distinction can be drawn on the basis 
that Botham concerned a residential mortgage, as opposed to the very different situations in 
Melluish and Elitestone.  However, regardless of whether the Court of Appeal succeeded in 
its ‘attempt to rationalise the law and to adapt long established wisdom and understandings to 
the realities of contemporary living’,104 the problem of whether it is actually valid for a lender 
to extend its security, nominally focused on the land, to personal property, remains 
unresolved.  It remains unclear whether the mortgagee can extend its security beyond the 
residential property to the goods therein.  More recent decisions touching on this issue, 
though only from the commercial direction, clearly show the courts relying more on assertion 
than analysis. 
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In the 2011 case National Westminster Bank v Hunter,
105
 Morgan J was faced with a 
mortgagee’s attempt to realise its security over farmland, against a background of complex 
and opaque negotiations between the mortgagor, the mortgagee and third parties (with 
various actual, alleged and potential interests in the land).  Morgan J refused to grant Hunter 
an order directing a sale of the land under the Law of Property Act 1925 s 91 (from Hunter to 
a company run by his wife), as it would have necessarily involved a breach of a contract 
Hunter had with one Taylor by virtue of an auction by a receiver.
106
  There was a second 
application, from the mortgagee, with regard to cattle that Hunter was keeping on the 
pertinent land.  The mortgagee sought an order under the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 
1977 s 13, which provides that pursuant to s 12, the bailee can require the bailor take delivery 
of goods (Hunter was already subject to a County Court order to remove the cattle
107
).  
Hunter argued that the s12 requirement that the goods be ‘in the possession or under the 
control of a bailee’ prevented the granting of the order as he, Hunter, and not the mortgagee, 
was in possession and had control of the goods.  Morgan J said that whilst ‘Hunter owns the 
cattle, the bank does not own the cattle and does not have a security interest in the cattle.  At 
any rate, I proceed on that basis for today’s purposes.  But possession and control do not turn 
upon ownership, one man can be the owner and another can be in possession and a third can 
have control.’108  As such Hunter’s argument failed.   
The reference to the mortgagee not having a security interest is interesting.  The bank 
did not claim a security interest in the cattle; the action solely concerned the acquisition of 
possession of the realty.  The nature of agricultural financing, and the lack of evidence of the 
content of the mortgage agreement, probably renders this decision sui generis.  However, this 
decision suggests the possibility that mortgagees introduce terms into mortgages that provide 
them with powers over goods held on the realty, in order to protect themselves in the event 
that defaulting mortgagors fail to remove goods from the realty.
109
  Yet issues of control (i.e. 
the power to ensure vacant possession by the removal of goods) and ownership (i.e. whether 
the mortgagee of realty has a security interest in goods on the realty) are distinct issues which 
deserve different treatment.
110
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In Peel Land and Property (Ports No 3) Ltd v T S Sheerness Steel (Ports No 3) Ltd,
111
 
the defendants had obtained a lease under which the original tenant covenanted to build a 
new steel manufacturing facility.  The claimants obtained the reversion of the lease and 
brought proceedings to prevent the defendants from disposing of plant and machinery on the 
site.  The Court of Appeal allowed the claimant’s appeal, on the grounds that at common law 
a tenant can remove any tenant’s fixture, but that such a right depends on the terms of the 
lease (and determining the extent of the contractual terms is a process of ordinary contractual 
interpretation; no special words are required).  Here the contract was sufficiently clear as to 
cover goods that became part of the demised property.  Allowing the tenant to dispose of 
such goods would contradict the commercial obligation at the heart of the agreement (i.e. to 
build the new steel factory).
112
 
The importance of the degree of annexation to the land is further illustrated by the 
decision of the High Court in Lictor Anstalt v Mir Steel UK Ltd and Libala Ltd.
113
  There the 
claimant had purchased equipment necessary to set up a steel mill, and allowed a steel 
company P to assemble the equipment and use it to make steel products on land owned by P.  
The claimants and P later entered an agreement purporting to regulate P’s use of the mill, 
which included a right for the claimant to remove the mill upon giving notice.  P’s 
administrators sold the land and the mill to the defendant.  Asplin J held that the test for 
annexation from Holland and Elitestone would be used, making it difficult to conclude 
anything other than that the equipment was intended to be at least semi-permanent.
114
  As the 
agreement between the claimant and P was intended to create contractual and equitable rights 
and obligations they had done so and thus even though the mill had become part of the land 
the agreement would still regulate the claimant’s rights over the mill.115 
                                                                                                                                                        
goods.  This would mean the attempts by mortgagees to give themselves powers by the mortgage agreement are 
best characterised as exclusion clauses for tortious liability.  The author acknowledges the strength of this 
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C. The Effect of the Bills of Sale Regime 
Individuals wanting to charge their goods must comply with the bills of sale legislation,
116
 
which sets out certain requirements for this type of security:
117
 ‘Speaking broadly [they] (1) 
avoid certain written instruments, (2) so far as they purport to create a security on personal 
chattels for the payment of money, unless (3) they comply with the conditions imposed by the 
Acts.’118  The bill of sale, which has to be for more than thirty pounds,119 must have an 
attached schedule of the personal property covered by the bill, without which the bill will be 
void against third parties.
120
  However, these requirements do not cover growing crops,
121
 or 
‘[a]ny fixtures separately assigned or charged’ or any ‘plant, or trade machinery’ used in 
substitution for similar things that are covered in the bill of sale.
122
  The bill of sale must be 
‘duly attested’ and registered under the provisions of the Bills of Sale Act 1878 within seven 
days of execution of the bill of sale;
123
 attestation requiring one or more witnesses not a party 
to the bill itself.
124
  Failure to register the bill (and, indeed, to continue to update the bill 
every five years) renders it void.
125
  The bills must be in a prescribed form,
126
 set out in a 
schedule to the 1878 Act,
127
 which is an essential aspect of a regime focused on 
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documentation rather than transactions.  Oral agreements for charges over personal property 
are outside this regime.
128
 
 The bills of sale legislation essentially prevents individuals granting effective floating 
charges over goods,
129
 not least because the requirement for a schedule of goods restricts bills 
of sale to already-owned goods,
130
 but also because a charge simpliciter is not an assurance as 
required by the regime.
131
  So whilst there may not be conceptual problems with individuals 
charging goods,
132
 the formal impossibility remains.  Nevertheless, it remains peculiarly 
unclear as to whether future goods can be captured by the bills of sale regime.  Future goods 
cannot be specified, and thus the formality requirements cannot be met, and so a bill over 
future goods is void.
133
  On the other hand, it has recently been held that equitable rights over 
future property are within the scope of the bills of sale regime, provided such rights are 
described with sufficient formality,
134
 and substitutions of identified goods for improvement 
or maintenance of the security are allowed.
135
  Gullifer and Hurst describe the substitution 
exception as ‘very limited’,136 but as the HSBC mortgage deed set out above indicates the 
issue of substitutions may actually be of greater importance. 
 Whilst the ambit of the bills of sale regime in the modern era is extremely limited,
137
 
the interaction between that regime and the law on fixtures was significant.
138
  The Bills of 
Sale Acts from 1854 were aimed at preventing creditors from being defrauded by debtors 
remaining in possession of encumbered goods,
139
 but the policy shifted rapidly with the Bills 
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of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882 preventing consumers from signing complicated 
documentation and thus unwittingly charging their personal property.
140
  This early form of 
“consumer protection” was inappropriate for “non-consumer”, i.e. commercial, borrowers,141 
but judicial manipulation of the law on fixtures in order to take certain goods and transactions 
out of the aegis of the bills of sale regime had already been underway throughout the 
nineteenth century.
142
     
Analysis of the case-law leading up to Holland v Hodgson,
143
 shows that the 
underlying purpose of that decision (and those that followed it) was resolution of the 
relationship between the bills of sale regime and the law on mortgages for commercial 
debtors and creditors.  In 1859 in Walmsley v Milne,
144
 the land owner mortgaged land prior 
to installation of equipment to enhance his business as a brewer.  By permanently attaching 
the goods to the realty, in order to enhance the realty, the goods had become part of the realty 
and could be taken by the mortgagee.  The same result occurred in 1866 in Cullwick v 
Swindell.
145
  In 1868 came Climie v Wood,
146
 a decision taken to be definitive in Holland v 
Hodgson,
147
 where Kelly CB in the Court of Exchequer stated that whilst there were 
exceptions to the principle quicquid planatur solo, solo cedit for (inter alia) tenants and 
landlords:  
 
no authority has been cited to shew that a mortgagor is entitled to remove such trade 
fixtures.  There have been several cases where the courts have decided that, upon the 
true construction of the mortgage deeds, trade fixtures were removable by the 
mortgagor, but not one to shew that such right exists without a special provision.  A 
mortgage is a security or pledge for a debt, and it is not unreasonable if a fixture be 
annexed to land at the time of a mortgage, or if the mortgagor in possession afterward 
                                                 
140
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annexes a fixture to it, that the fixtures shall be deemed an additional security for the 
debt whether it be a trade fixture or a fixture of any other kind.
148
   
 
The importance of the nature of the agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee is clear, 
as is the possibility of a mortgagor charging after-acquired personal property.  In Longbottom 
v Berry,
149
 in 1869, the mortgagor acquired goods which were attached to the land for the 
purposes of improving the land’s role in his business, after the land had been mortgaged to 
the defendant bank.  Following this, the mortgagor assigned to the plaintiff his goods, under a 
duly registered bill of sale.  After the mortgagor became bankrupt, the plaintiff took 
possession of the goods.  The plaintiff and defendant agreed the goods should be sold; the 
court would determine entitlement to the fund.  The Court of Queen’s Bench held the goods 
that had been attached to the land (the overwhelming majority of the enumerated chattels) 
passed to the mortgagee, following the approach set out in Walmsely and Cullwick.
150
  As to 
those goods not affixed to the land, they would pass to the plaintiff holder of the bill of sale.  
However, no separate justification for this was given; the clear implication was that the 
nature of the affixation was determinative.  This approach, following the approval of 
Longbottom in Holland, would come to dominate thinking in this area.   
In Holland v Hodgson the owner had mortgaged his real property to the plaintiff.  
Following this was an assignment of the owner’s property to the defendants (who had taken 
as trustees for the benefit of the owner’s creditors).  The assignment was not registered as a 
bill of sale under the Bills of Sale Act 1854, and thus by section 1 it was void as against the 
defendants ‘so far as it was a transfer of “personal chattels” within the meaning of that Act’, 
with the Act defining by section 7 that ‘personal chattels’ included fixtures.  Thus the Court 
thought it ‘properly admitted, that where there is a conveyance of the land the fixtures are 
transferred, not as fixtures, but as part of the land, and the deed of transfer does not require 
registration as a bill of sale.’151  The Court also noted that the decision in Mather v Fraser,152 
had stood for some time, and ‘[i]t is of great importance that the law as to what is the security 
of a mortgagee should be settled; … we feel that it should not be reversed unless we clearly 
see that it is wrong.’153  Mather concerned the overlap between mortgage law and the law on 
bills of sale, but what is clear is that the point of the litigation in Holland was merely to avoid 
                                                 
148
 (1867-68) LR 3 Ex 257, 260.  See also (1868-69) LR 4 Ex 328, 330 (Willes J). 
149
 (1869) LR 5 QB 123. 
150
 Ibid, 127. 
151
 (1872) LR 7 CP 328, 333. 
152
 (1856) 2 K & J 536; 69 ER 895. 
153
 (1872) LR 7 CP 328, 340. 
Page 22 of 30 
 
the problems caused by the Bills of Sale Acts.  It is at least arguable that Holland’s role as the 
leading authority for the meaning of fixtures must be limited, and that its true value lies in 
demonstrating the mechanism by which mortgagees can extend their security into personal 
property i.e. by determining things to be fixtures. 
Mather v Fraser,
154
 concerned the status of machinery fixed to the floor of a factory.  
The Vice-Chancellor Sir W Page Wood applied the basic rule that if goods had become 
annexed to the land they would become part of the realty and thus come under the 
mortgagee’s interest.  As to the argument that the failure to register the transfer of the 
machine as a bill of sale would void the agreement, he held that the Bills of Sale Act 1854 
would not apply:  
 
That Act only says that where a person makes a bill of sale of any part of his chattels, 
including fixtures, that bill of sale must be registered in a particular way.  Here, no 
bill of sale was ever required to be made.  A conveyance is made of the freehold, and 
that conveyance carries fixtures.  To hold that an Act of Parliament, which says that, 
where bills of sale are used, they shall be dealt with in a particular manner, applies to 
a case where no such thing is used or required to be used, but where the whole of the 
property passes by the conveyance of the fee-simple would be to give a construction 
to the Act far beyond anything which was within its purview.
155
 
 
For the Vice-Chancellor,
156
 the Bills of Sale Act 1854 was intended to deal with cases such as 
Ex Parte Sparrow,
157
 where a mortgage over all the personal property of the mortgagor had 
been granted, and the mortgagee was entitled to take possession upon default.  The mortgagee 
did take possession, just before the mortgagor became bankrupt.  The Vice-Chancellor 
considered this to have been a ‘very great convenience’,158 and in Ex Parte Sparrow Knight 
Bruce LJ ‘expressed great doubt as to the validity of such provisions, unless the assignor had 
substantially other property besides that comprised in the deed, or was in solvent 
circumstances independently of that property.’159  The Bills of Sale Act 1854 was intended to 
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solve this particular potential problem,
160
 but there is little in the way of clarification of the 
statutes of after-acquired goods.  More importantly, the lack of appropriate delineation 
between consumer and commercial situations, though almost certainly anachronistic, is at the 
root of the current conceptual and practical problems.   
 Subsequent changes to the bills of sales regime did not lead to a change in judicial 
approach.  In 1888 the Court of Appeal was faced with In re Yates, Batcheldor v Yates.
161
  
Here the owner of land (which was used for business purposes) mortgaged the land without 
any reference to fixtures or trade machinery.  Following the mortgagor’s death, his creditors 
argued the mortgage was void as to the trade machinery, under the Bills of Sale Acts 1878 
and 1882.  Lindley LJ said:  
 
where the mortgaged property includes valuable trade machinery ... [t]he question we 
have to decide is this, whether a mortgagee of a mill, under a mortgage framed as this 
is, can seize and sever and sell, apart from the land or mill, the trade machinery on it.  
If he can, then it strikes me, that, as regards trade machinery, it would be impossible 
to avoid the conclusion that this is a bill of sale, and void because it is not 
registered.
162
   
 
Since the machinery passed only by virtue of being attached to the freehold, and the mortgage 
deed only provided a power of sale and not a power to possess the machinery as goods 
separate from taking possession of the freehold, the mortgage was not an assignment of the 
machinery.
163
  The key test was whether the goods had become fixtures, in which case they 
simply become part of the land, even if this test was more formal than functional.
164
  Thus the 
mortgage was not a bill of sale within the meaning of the Acts and thus gave a valid security 
over the goods.  However, judicial dislike for the legislative deeming, by section 5 of the 
                                                 
160
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1878 Act, of trade machinery to be goods, arguably caused judicial restriction of the debate 
over the extent to which goods become attached to land.
165
 
In re Yates was distinguished soon after, in Small v National Provincial Bank of 
England,
166
 which concerned a conveyance of mortgaged land ‘together with all and singular 
the fixed and moveable plant machinery and fixtures, implements and utensils now or 
hereafter fixed to or placed upon or used in or about the said hereditaments and premises.’  
The mortgagee had attempted to sell machinery, in which the claimants had an interest as 
trustees for the mortgagor’s creditors.  In contrast to In re Yates, ‘personal chattels are plainly 
assigned quâ chattels, and not as a portion of the land.’167  Stirling J dismissed an argument 
that the reference to fixtures in the deed was mere surplusage,
168
 thus there had been an 
assignment of the machinery.  The failure to register the deed as a bill of sale rendered it 
void, entitling the claimants to an injunction.
169
  Within a couple of months In re Brooke 
came before Kekewich J.
170
  In Brooke the conveyance did mention machinery (unlike Yates) 
but it did not have the additional wording which enabled Stirling J to distinguish Small from 
Yates.
171
  Thus Yates applied, and Kekewich J stated ‘that, apart from any criticism of the 
words of the instrument, you cannot say that fixed machinery which was conveyed to the 
mortgagee as part of the premises to which it was attached is a separable part of the 
mortgaged property in the state in which it was subjected to the mortgage.’172 
 In Ellis v Glover and Hobson Ltd,
173
 there was a mortgage of freehold land, with a 
covenant not to remove fixtures without the mortgagee’s consent.  Trade machinery was 
installed under a hire-purchase agreement: title would pass only on full payment and the 
vendor could remove the machinery in the event of default.  Upon such removal, the 
mortgagee sued.  It was held that the machinery had passed with the freehold.  The Court of 
Appeal had to contend with the various opinions expressed in Hobson v Gorringe and 
Reynolds v Ashby,
174
 as well as its prevision decision in Gough v Wood.
175
  Whilst in Gough 
this permission to remove goods was implied, in Ellis no such implication was possible.  
Fletcher-Moulton LJ held so even though it gave rise to the potential for fraud on the part of 
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the mortgagor and mortgagee as against third party financiers of goods attached to the 
realty.
176
  He based this on the difficulties faced by third parties in finding out if there was 
actually a mortgage over the relevant land,
177
 and whilst he thought estoppel might protect 
against fraud he could see no case that went so far and thus he would rely on intervention 
from the legislature or the House of Lords to alter the law.
178
  In essence, there has to be an 
agreement to protect the mortgagee from claims that it had taken goods it was not entitled to, 
and this was the case here. 
Finally, it is worth noting Re Rogerstone Brick and Stone Co Ltd,
179
 as that case is 
cited by Cousins and Clarke as authority for the general rule that fixtures pass to the 
mortgagee.
180
  The Court of Appeal considered whether a debenture holder was entitled to the 
proceeds of sale of goods.  The Court held that a company’s interest in goods as a mortgagor 
ended when the goods were sold by the mortgagee.  The right of the mortgagee to remove 
fixtures, as against the company’s lessor, did not infringe the Bills of Sale Acts.  Younger J in 
the Chancery Division held it was ‘clear that a mortgage of a lease by the lessee will carry 
with it the fixtures of the property which is in lease when the power to remove the fixtures is 
in the tenant’,181 meaning in effect that the mortgagor in the course of a trade cannot remove 
fixtures as against the mortgagee, other than when goods are not owned by the mortgagor.
182
  
In the Court of Appeal it was confirmed that the tenor of the mortgage was such that there 
was no separate right to the goods.
183
  The goods, as fixtures, did not have a sufficiently 
separate identity, though severance of the fixtures would suffice to enable the mortgagor to 
recover them at any point in the future.
184
  
McBain suggests that the differentiation between trade and non-trade fixtures in the 
bills of sale regime was formulated in order to take into account a residence-based home-
workshop economy.
185
  However, the Victorian period, i.e. the relevant period for the 
doctrinal development considered herein, saw a massive shift away from home-workshops 
and the putting-out system that necessitated such structures (and the authorities herein 
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demonstrate that trade-fixture cases truly involved situations other than home-workshops).
186
  
‘Once a place of production, new technology was turning the house into a place of 
consumption’.187  There was significant change in the volume and nature of consumption of 
goods by individuals throughout the Victorian period.
188
  A considerable proportion of those 
new goods connected to the home itself: cooking and cleaning implements, cutlery and 
crockery, and decorative and ornamental objects,
189
 alongside consumables such as drinks or 
foodstuffs.  Some of these new goods would themselves increase consumption,
190
 and fashion 
began to exert its own power to enforce and enhance consumption.
191
  These changes in 
material culture did not have a substantive impact on judicial reasoning though, which may 
simply be due to the (inevitably) greater volume of commercial disputes concerning 
commercial goods.  The law had changed though, meaning that the courts, to protect 
commercial interests in light of an utterly inappropriate bills of sale regime, had to formulate 
procrustean rules for fixtures and fittings which could not provide an appropriate regime in 
light of the development of both a culture of consumerism of both land (in the form of 
residential consumer purchase-money mortgages) and goods. 
1  ARGUMENTS AGAINST ALLOWING MORTGAGEES TO ACQUIRE SECURITY 
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY  
If a mortgage agreement can cover after-acquired goods, mortgagees would benefit from the 
creation of an unregistered security interest which neither fits within the scheme of land 
registration,
192
 nor within the current structure of security interests over goods.
193
  Yet this is 
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the effect of the nineteenth and early twentieth century judicial attempts to carve out 
protection for commercial lenders in response to the bills of sale regime, under the guise of 
the application of an alleged doctrine of fixtures and fittings.  The functional effect of this has 
been the creation of a loophole, enabling mortgages to cover after-acquired goods, and this 
appears to be what the HSBC mortgage agreement set out above is attempting to do.  
Furthermore, recent judicial preference for assertion over analysis has not clarified whether 
this is appropriate.  Nevertheless, there are some suggestions that consumers should be able 
to grant a non-possessory security interest over their goods.
194
  It is argued that this is the 
wrong approach. 
The shift in the relationship between commercial and consumer consumption of goods 
must be placed alongside historical understanding of real property ownership and control 
ideologies.  As Fox notes, the 1925 property reforms ‘provided the courts with the ideology, 
the language, the tools and the justification to adopt a presumption in favour of sale, to value 
land as a capital asset only, and to disregard the non-financial interests of occupiers in their 
homes.’195  This ideology of property-commensurability focuses not on users (mortgagors), 
but on those concerned with the exchange value, i.e. creditors (mortgagees).
196
  The 
establishment of this ideology arguably prevented re-assessment, in light of the substantial 
growth in mortgage-financed home-ownership, of the capacity of consumer residential 
mortgagors to charge after-acquired personal property by virtue of the initial residential 
purchase-price mortgage.  This combined with the growth in acquisition of goods dislocated 
the commercially-focused doctrine from the practical reality of personal property and 
consumer purchase-money mortgages. 
English law affords only limited recognition to a concept of “home”,197 and has 
tended to subject the very notion of “home” to “commercialism”.198  However, the notion of 
“home” as a legally valuable concept has gained considerable academic traction.199  Whilst 
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there are various conceptualisations of the elements that make up “home”,200 a key factor 
amongst others is how residential property provides unique canvases for the expression of 
self by the acquisition of things,
201
 a ‘backdrop’ for living.202  Things – goods – are props for 
living.  Yet the sentimentalizing and thus the trivialisation of the concept of “home” make it 
easy to exclude the concept from legal analysis;
203
 this makes it in turn equally easy to 
devalue those props of life: goods.  The laudable aims of those engaged in attempting to give 
greater legal value to the concept of “home” is acknowledged, but it is submitted that their 
position would only be strengthened through acknowledgement and utilization of the 
importance and value of things in the development of a more comprehensive and accurate 
representation of a concept of “home”.204 
The demonstrable personal relationship people can have with goods,
205
 affects how 
people view their homes.
206
  Goods within the physical house are as important to the 
development of a “home” as the physical structure itself:207 ‘A house encompasses an array 
of different materials, from furniture and fixture to ornaments and décor, collectively creating 
a dwelling experience that is greater than the sum of its parts … They are what transforms 
our house into our home’.208  Even if the goods are peripheral, then they can have a framing 
effect,
209
 or a signalling function.
210
  Our relationships with things directly and indirectly 
reveal aspects of ourselves:
211
 ‘possessions often remain profound and usually the closer our 
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relationships are with objects, the closer our relationships are with people.’212  Serious 
individual, familial, and social costs result from repossession of a house.
213
  These costs 
would be exacerbated if the mortgagee could also repossess goods, the loss of which can also 
lead to serious psychological harm.
214
   
D. Conclusion 
The consequence of the current doctrinal position is that mortgagors might not realise the 
extent mortgagees can control their goods, and the exercise of such control might have a 
disproportionately negative impact.  As Lord Cozens-Hardy MR warned a century ago: ‘it 
certainly seems to me to savour of serfdom to say “You shall not leave the house in which 
you are living without my consent; you shall not dispose of a chair or a table in your house on 
which I have no charge without my consent, and if you do the whole amount of principal and 
interest will immediately become payable instead of being payable by instalments.”’215   
There are many factors that have impacted on this area of law, but it is clear that the 
law on fixtures and fittings and mortgages was heavily influenced by the effect of the bills of 
sale regime.  Reform of the archaic bills of sale regime is essential,
216
 and though recent 
experience does not bode well,
217
 the Law Commission has begun the process of analysing 
the current regime, with an aim to publishing recommendations for reform in the summer of 
2016.
218
  It remains to be seen whether the specific problem identified in this article will be 
examined, let alone resolved, especially as the reform process is focused on the problems 
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facing non-corporate creditors and debtors.
219
  Recent government intervention to protect 
persons from being dispossessed of their goods for non-payment of rent must be 
applauded.
220
  If this restriction is possible, then surely prohibitions on residential purchase-
money mortgagees extending security over after-acquired goods must also be politically, if 
not judicially, possible.  If mortgagees wish to have a right to remove goods from land in 
order to reduce waste or to enable efficient disposition of repossessed land, then they should 
be allowed to only in the narrowest fashion.  This should take the form of an express 
agreement separate to the mortgage deed (rather than being a component part of the mortgage 
deed).  For residential mortgages at least, this right should not be allowed to take the form of 
security over the goods themselves.  If creditors wish to acquire security over goods, then 
they must be required to follow the requirements for such a transaction (and in such cases the 
proposals of the Law Commission on bills of sale would be broadly appropriate).
221
  The law 
of fixtures and fittings should not be used as a tool to avoid the strictures of personal property 
security law. 
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 The author has responded to that consultation (in a joint response with Dr Orkun Akseli, Durham Law 
School).  Economy unfortunately prevents a detailed examination of those proposals here.   
